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Abstract
In this paper the autonomy concept used by ESA and NASA is critically evalu-
ated. Moreover, a more proper ground-control/spacecraft organizational structure is
proposed on the basis of a new, more elaborated concept of autonomy. In an extended
theoretical discussion its definitional properties and functionalities are established. The
rather basic property of adaptivity leads to the categorization of behaviour into the
modes of satisfaction and avoidance behaviour. However, the autonomy property with
the most profound consequences is goal-robustness. The mechanism that implements
goal-robustness tests newly generated goals and externally received goals on consis-
tency with high-level goals. If goals appear not to be good instantiations or more
acceptable replacements of existing goals, they are rejected. This means that ground-
control has to cooperate with the spacecraft instead of (intermittently) commanding
it.
Introduction
In current spacecraft control engineering two theoretical approaches can be distinguished,
viz. [1] equipping spacecraft with autonomy, making them less dependent on ground con-
trol and [2] distributing intelligent functions to optimize performance on pre-defined system
requirements. Spacecraft autonomy is viewed as a major design goal by leading institu-
tions such as NASA and the European Space Agency (ESA). The main reason for making
spacecraft less dependent on ground control, cf. [1], is that total control of the spacecraft is
practically unfeasible due to e.g. limited visibility of on-board events. The reason for dis-
tributing intelligent functions, of. [2], is optimization from the point of view of the complete
ground-control/spacecraft organization e.g. reduction of operation costs and localization of
computational resources, cf. (Grant, 1994; Aarup et ai., 1994).
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Usually autonomy is defined loosely, which inevitably leads to problems when it is attempted
to be used as a design specification cf. (Easter & Staehle, 1984). We critically evaluate the
autonomy concept developed by ESA in section 2. From this it will be clear that, before
trying to use it, the concept of autonomy needs to be defined first, which is the aim of this
paper. The concept of autonomy is developed from contrasting two possible organizational
design stances as known in Distributed Artificial Intelligence (DAI), viz. Multi-Agent Sys-
tems (MAS) and Distributed Problem Solving (DPS) in section 3, that correspond to the
design stances [1] and [2]. In MAS and [1] the emphasis is on autonomy, while in DPS it is
on dividing and localizing the functionality of the whole system. It will be pointed out that
the functionality of autonomy and the property of independence 1 belong to MAS. Although
DPS and MAS may be seen as poles of a continuum, the predominant pole determines both
the agent architecture and the organizational possibilities.
In section 4 and 5 we will engage in a full discussion of the origin of autonomy and its func-
tionafity. The argument runs as follows: agents that are exposed to uncertain circumstances
in which they want to persist have to be adaptive. Systems theory provides an elementary
architecture that is maximally adaptive (a feedback system) but has one fundamental inabil-
ity: it can't change its own goals. Yet, an agent that is based on a feedback architecture can
generate or receive new goals, but they have to be instantiations of the unchangeable, high-
level goals. In this respect changes to, or generation of goals is restricted, which provides a
heuristic warranty to goal approach; this is called goal robustness. Goal robustness provides
independence from other agents, it will only commit itself to goals that conform with its
high-level goals. Independence is thus specified and is a major characteristic of autonomous
agents. Finally, we will evaluate what the application in spacecraft architecture of this newly
developed concept of autonomy would mean.
2 Spacecraft Autonomy and Automation: a Critical Evaluation
The autonomy concept as developed by ESA (the Standard Generic Approach to Spacecraft
Autonomy and Automation; SGASAA, cf. (Pidgeon etal., 1992) was primarily intended to
enable spacecraft to continue with their mission, in case of temporary loss of contact with
ground control. Any spacecraft that can't be controlled from the ground station and has
no means of controlling itself soon perishes. Additional motivations for making spacecraft
more independent from ground control, are that due to small communication bandwidths
of deep space missions there is little visibili'ty of on-board events and, additionally, long
transmission time weaken promptness of the spacecrafts reaction. Also, operation costs
would be significantly reduced because there is no need for continuous presence of "marching
armies" of ground controllers 2.
XIndependence is often equated with autonomy, as in (Easter & Stachle, 1984, p. 2-1): "Spacecraft
Autonomy: The independence of the man/machine flight system from direct, real-time control by the ground
over a specified period of time _. In this paper, by independence 'withdrawal from or dismissal of control' is
meant. The paper is intended to specify the meaning of independence through defining autonomy.
2Although this quote is taken from a JPL paper (Easter & Staehle, 1984) it also reflects the SGASAA
viewpoint rather weft.
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Basically, the SGASAA concept proposes that the spacecraft should posses a copy of high-
level ground-control command sequences or goals (contained in the Master Schedule), so that
in the event of a communication failure the spacecraft is able to plan in order to reach the
high-level goals. Independent planning is done under supervision of an Onboard Management
System that, according to the concept, is able to reschedule the Master Schedule, monitors
task execution, co-ordinates and controls the various subsystems and payload managers.
Planning is hierarchical in the sense that there is a network of plans with at the top the most
abstract Long-Term Operations Plan that defines the objectives for an entire mission, and at
the bottom Elementary Commands. Also fault diagnosis and recovery should be performed
onboard in case a failure coincides with communication loss. There are three modes of
operation, viz. [1] routine mode, in which nominal and expected tasks are executed, [2]
crisis mode that deals with unexpected events that results in plan failure and [3] check-out
mode that checks the proper functioning of the soft- and hardware.
SGASAA has two major drawbacks that raise questions about the alleged autonomy of a
spacecraft with SGASAA functionality, viz. [1] the origin of the Master Schedule and [2]
the ability of fault diagnosis and recovery. The Master schedule is completely synthesized
at the ground station and it consists purely of expandable macro's. The spacecraft only has
the abilities to expand the macro's and set parameters, which cannot be called planning.
Moreover, ground control can bypass the Onboard Management System and directly com-
mand the payloads which would nullify all possible advantages in the case of independent
planning, e.g. the adequacy of decisions based on richer knowledge of the actual situation.
Concerning the second mentioned drawback, it was known from the outset that only ex-
pected failures could be catered for. However, failure recovery should, of course, go beyond
expected failures.
In spite of the SGASAA aims, the spacecraft remains dependent on the ground station for
almost all of its directing functions. In the remaining part of this paper we will develop an
alternative concept of autonomy that has a firm theoretical basis and opens up the way to
total independent functioning of the spacecraft. We will begin by examining two possible
design principles for interacting intelligent systems stemming from Distributed Artificial In-
telligence (DAI), viz. Distributed Problem Solving (DPS) and Multi-Agent Systems (MAS).
3 DPS and MAS as Design Principles for Interacting Agents
Distributed AI (DAI) is the field in which systems are designed that have intelligence dis-
tributed over a number of distributed nodes or agents. The intelligence consists of knowledge
about the problem space (that may or may not be fully specified) and knowledge about
problem solving. Applying DAI techniques is useful when the problem under consideration
is intrinsically distributed, e.g. geographically when monitoring the movements of vehicles
and hypothesizing about their paths, or coordinating the flight movements of aircraft, cf.
(Durfee et al., 1987; Durfee et al., 1988; Steeb et al., 1988). DAI systems can generally be
designed from two perspectives: Distributed Problem Solving (DPS) or Multi-Agent Systems
(MAS). Both systems consist of agents and their organization but DPS takes as its starting
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point a particular problem with an adequate organization of distributed nodes, while MAS
begins with design specifications of individual agents. (Bond & Gasser, 1988, p. 3) define
the two fields as follows:
* DPS considers how the work of solving a particular problem can be divided among
a number of modules, or "nodes", that cooperate at the level of dividing and sharing
knowledge about the problem and about the developing solution.
• MAS is concerned with coordinating intelligent behaviour among a collection of (pos-
sibly pre-existing) autonomous intelligent "agents", how they can coordinate their
knowledge, goals, skills, and plans jointly to take action or to solve problems.
However, these descriptions, however, don't supply a distinctive criterion for the two fields
since there can be many variations of designs that are intermediate. A reason to qualify a
system as either DPS or MAS would, in this view, be only a particular stance with which the
system is designed. A top down design, taking an organizational perspective, would qualify
th system as DPS while a bottom up design, aimed at designing individual agents, would
render a MAS. Figure 1 depicts this view.
DPS MAS
organization I coordination of activities possible cooperationorganization
T
agent-design embedded, strictly determinedbenevolent [ agent-design ] independent
Figure 1: DPS as top-down and MAS as bottom-up designs. The arrows
represent typica/consequences following from starting-point design restric-
tions.
(Durfee & Rosenschein, 1994) propose individually different utility functions and means to
maximize individual payoff as the fundamental difference between DPs and MAS. This is
an underspecification, however, because agents can be designed in such a way that utility
maximization of the individuals contributes to the higher order, organizational goal. Durfee
and Rosenschein therefore consider MAS and DPS properties in more detail to be more
specific about the self-lnterestedness criterion for MAS agents.
Another way to look at the difference is by considering DPS as a subset of MAS through a
certain number of extra assumptions that hold for DPS, viz. [1] the benevolence assumption,
i.e. agents are willing to help each other whenever possible, [2] the common goal assump-
tion, i.e. DPS agents all have the same goal which may be explicitly represented but may
also be embedded in the organization and possible roles agents can assume under Certain
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circumstances, [3] the centralized designer assumption, i.e. the designer controls all aspects
of agent behaviour in a fully specified environment. To summarize: in DPS the agent design
is completely dependent upon the higher order goal and behaviour is completely determined
by organizational choices meant to solve a particular problem.
There are a few problems with these criteria. First, as Durfee & Rosenschein observe, even
with the mentioned assumptions, DPS systems do not necessarily function optimal due to
non-optimal local decisions made by the individual nodes. Also, the extent to which the goals
should differ to categorize them as MAS agents is unclear. Finally, it is possible to equip
agents with a payoff function that instantiates a high-order goal which makes it difficult to
decide whether they are MAS or DPS agents. In fact, this was the reason to view DPS and
MAS designs as spanning a continuum in which both designs may have different starting
points. Table 1 contains a summary of the contrasting properties of DPS and MAS.
Table 1: Contrast/ng DPS and MAS properties
DPS MAS
agent design depends on organisational pre-existing / pre-formed agents
choices
benevolent self-interested
common goals/utility function individual goals/utillty function
fully specified environment unspecified / partly specified
environment
organizational coordination of results and/or societal cooperation on basis of joint plan
tasks formation
global success criteria situation assessment based on goal states
domain-specific problem solving individual problem solving / self-maintenance
Hence, neither the individual utility function, nor the restrictions on MAS that define DPS,
provide a decisive criterion. The problem is that although the possession of individual utility
functions seems s good candidate, it is difficult to determine whether they are dependent on
the social goal. In fact, goals in artificial agents are always dependent on the goals of the
designer _.
Thus, we argue that the only way to be certain that the agents are self-interested and that
their goal structure doesn't depend on the designer's, is that the agent's goal structure has
evolved from scratch in a real environment. This is the case only for living organisms. Hence,
autonomous agents cannot be designed but rather have evolved by themselves. Still, to be
practical, we can maintain a notion of quasi-autonomy. An agent is quasi-autonomous if it
mimics the functionality of autonomous agents. Autonomous agents have to preserve them-
selves, which is the first, and necessary, requirement for self-interestedness. Self-preservation,
in turn, requires adaptability.
3We can be quite fussy about this point and argue that even ff agents have random goals, they axe still
dependent on the designer's goals, because he or she has had reasons (motives) to design the agents' goal
structure in that particular way.
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It will be clear by now, that SGASAA functionality doesn't come near quasi-autonomous
functionality. SGASAA is much closer to the DPS pole, because of the limitless way ground
control can influence the goals of the spacecraft. Nevertheless, taking the fact into account
that spacecraft indeed face uncertain circumstances and that they should preserve themselves
(which is one of the motivations for SGASAA), its design actually should be closer to our
concept of (quasi-)autonomy. In the next section we will again consider the origin of the
goals of adaptive systems and further examine adaptive functionality from a theoretical
perspective to specify what autonomous agents should be capable of.
4 Autonomy as Resulting from Constraints on Adaptation
In this section we will give an explanation of the autonomy feature of independency that in
our view arises from the property of adaptivity. The first observation, drawn from traditional
systems theory, will be that maximally adaptive systems are goaLdirected, i.e. they try to
lift the discrepancy between measurements from situations and an internally represented
goal-state using feedback to guide action. Secondly we will address the origin of the goals
in adaptive systems. Since certain goals can't be changed agent-internally, we also have to
look at the goal development from a intra-specimen perspective, which will be called the
[ylogenesis of goals.
Finally, we will look at a possible architecture that takes elementary adaptive units as
its building blocks to comprise a more general adaptive system that besides the already
facilitated functionality of goal achievement, which we shall call satisfaction behaviour, also
displays goal patching or avoidance behaviour when the threat that a particular goal will
not be achieved becomes too big.
In this section, we primarily establish that adaptive systems contain a core of stable goals,
i.e. a core that can't be influenced. In the next section we will look at what that means for
a system that is capable of generating goals endogenously or capable of receiving external
goals. Figure 2 summarizes what issues will be considered in what order in this and the next
section.
Independence _ Goal-Robustness ,a
Autonomy _
Biological or System
Adaptivity _- theoretical foundation
Goals and Genesis
Figure 2: The taro parts of autonomy and their relationship. Independence
is justitled by the MAS property of adapticeness to uneerta/n circumstances.
8O
4.1 First Ramifications of Adaptivity: a Systems Theoretic Approach
"l_aditional]y, system theory, cf. (Glisson, 1985), roughly divides (linearlzed) systems into
three categories, viz. [1] I/O systems [2] systems with a state representation or a state vector
[3] feedback systems. I/O systems doesn't have a 'memory' and their output is a (linear)
transformation of the input. Systems with a state representation have an output function
which is dependent on the previous state a_d possibly a direct component from the input.
In feedback systems, output is directed back through a function that contrasts output with
desired output. A block-diagram of an output-feedback system can be found in figure 3, cf.
(Owens, 1978).
e(t) __
feedback loop
Figure 3: A constant output feedback-control system.
The system equations are as follows:
= + e R"
v(t) = v(t) e R", u(t) e R'
The state vector is denoted by z, together with corresponding transformation matrix A it
comprises a 'memory'; u is the input vector with transformation B; Y the output vector that
depends on the state through transformation C. A m × 1 vector of demanded outputs, r(t)
can be constructed, to result in an error vector e(t) = r(t) - y(t) that is fed back into the
system, resulting in the input u(t) = De(g) where D is a constant I × m matrix.
An output feedback control (OFC) system is a straightforward extension of the two simpler
systems. In addition to the I/0 model, 'memory' is added which makes iterated action
possible, and in addition to the state-vector system feedback is added, which makes it possible
to compare output with desired output.
Comparing output with demanded output is a test for performance, or a test to what extent
the situation converges towards the desired state. Demanded output can thus be seen as a
goal and feedback gives an indication of how closely the system has neared the goal-state 4.
The limitations of the OFC system are that only information is processed that a priori was
established as goal-relevant.
According to a classification of (Cariani, 1991, p. 786), there are two types of systems below
4This system-theoretic classification can very well be mapped on the classification of (Genesereth
Silsson, 1987). They distinguish [1] tropistic agents (I/O systems) [2] hysteretic agents (state vector systems)
and [3] knowledge-level systems (OFC systems).
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the adaptive one that don't dispose of the capacity to learn or use a feedback design, viz. [I]
fixed computational and [2] fixed-robotic. They do have the capacity to respectively execute
pre-specified rules and execute fixed percept-action combinations but not to optimize their
percept-action coordination. He calls the OFC system the adaptive device type and there is
another more general adaptive system, vlz. the genera/evolutionary device type. Cariani's
classification can be found in table 2. In the next subsection we will focus on the difference
between the adaptive and the general evolutionary system in order to establish the maximally
feasible adaptive system and its properties.
Table 2: Device types according to Cariani, a representative of A-Life
Device Type "capacities Limitations
fixed reliable execution of pre-specified rules limited to pre-specified rules and states
computational
-fixed robotic reliable execution of fixed percept- no feedback or learning from the
action combinations environment
adaptive performance-dependent optima]ization limited to percept _z action categories
of percept-action coordination fixed by the sensors _ effectors
general creation of new percept _ action cat- time to construct _ test new sensors 8z
evolutionary egories: performance-dependent opti- effectors may be very long
malization within these categories
4.2 Passing Fitness Criteria through the Genome
As we have noted in section 3 the genesis of the goals in adaptive systems plays a key role in
the notion of autonomy. To be genuinely autonomous, the goals of an agent should originate
from the objective of self-preservance in an uncertain environment. The issue we will now
consider concerns the process of genesis, i.e. how goals can evolve and especially the question
whether individual agents are capable of changing or generating a//of their goals themselves
(i.e. intra-specimen) or that change happens inter-specimen.
According to Cariani there exists an adaptive device that is more general than an OFC, viz.
the evolutionary device type. This device is capable of the development of new sensors, estab-
llslfing new computations on new sensory primitives (what he calls eplstemica/ly autonomous,
we will not consider this property further) and constructing their own performance-measuring
apparatuses (this is what he calls motivatlonally autonomous, Ibid. p. 789). Motivationally
autonomous agents change their evaluative criteria (what we have called norms Or goals)
themselves.
OFC systems are directed towards the norm, they evaluate output using the norm. If they
would be able to change their norm, there would be no guiding criterion because the norm
itself has that function. This means that systems capable of changing the norm must do so
arbitrarily. For systems that must maintain themselves changing the goal that they want to
achieve arbitrarily involves a high risk. Goals that are generated arbitrarily may direct the
system to self-destruction. Without a stable prior goal, there is no way new goals can be
tested on adversity or beneficiality. It could even be argued that the general evolutionary
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devicetype can't be classified as an adaptive system because there is no demanded output,
after all, if something is demanded then a random mutation of it is not necessarily demanded.
If we look at the evolution of natural agents, experiments that randomly change the architec-
ture of organisms take place but inter-specimen rather than intra-speclmen. Mutations take
place from one generation on to the next and the success of this experiment is determined
by fitness criteria s. If a specimen matches the fitness criteria well enough, the changes are
passed through the genome and remain stable in the next specimen. Comparing possible
architectures in terms of systems theory leads to the conclusion that OFC systems have
an advantage because they are goal-directed but only if their norm is a proper representa-
tion of environmental survival conditions, i.e. if the norm has developed under evolutionary
conditions. We call the evolutionary development of goals the fylogenesls of the goals.
Changing evaluative criteria arbltrarl/¥ is unpermittable for individual specimens because it
leaves them without any success criteria of their action which would nullify the advantages
of feedback. From this we conclude that a more general adaptive device through flexibility
of the totality of goals, is not feasible. However, there is an extension of the adaptive device
that consists of layers of OFC systems and has important, indlspensable functionality. We
will turn to this now.
4.3 Reflectiveness in Task Networks of OFC systems
Although Cariani's evolutionary device type doesn't provide a more general adaptive system
than the OFC, the adaptive functionality of an OFC can be extended. Briefly this can
be achieved by recursively linking the OFC systems into a task network so that there is a
hierarchy with at the top level OFC systems representing the fylogenetic goals (we will call
these primitive goals) and at the bottom level OFC systems that perform action primitives
and intermediate subgoals 6.
In comparison to classical planners, cf. (Charniak & McDermott, 1985, ch. 9), task networks
consisting of OFC systems have an important advantage over traditional planning operators.
In traditional planning theory monitoring the execution of a plan is identified as one of the
most intricate problems (Ibid. p. 489, 524). The decision when to abandon a subgoal
(i.e. assessment of the situation to establish the rate of convergence to the goal state), is
of prime importance in plan-execution monitoring. This decision can be based on the rate
of goal-state convergence. However, a single OFC system is not able to change its action
pattern; in fact, it can only amp///'y its attempts. Hence, if convergence is too slow or if
the situation diverges from the goal-state, there should be a possibility to change the action
pattern altogether.
The creation of a task network with OFC systems is straightforward because each OFC has
SFitness is defined in (Koza, 1992, p. 94) as the probability that an individual survives to the age of
reproduction and reproduces. In Artificial Life there are usually other methods of measuring fitness than
reproduction, e.g. in a population of artificial ants it can be the number of food parcels eaten.
ewe will not elaborate much on the linking mechanism because of space limitations. An elaborate
discussion of this can be found in (Nilsson, 1994).
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a description of its goal state in r. If lr is the overall goal and there exists a schedule of
(rl U r2 U ... U r,_) __D_-, a task network for Ir exists. Execution of any current subgoal can be
monitored by examining if the output converges to its desired state:
(rp - yp(t)) -(rp - yp(t + 1)) _< c. Using an abstract matching operator M, then if there is
an alternative goal rq such that rqMr P and zp(t) _ zq(t), then an alternative task network
can be reassembled on the failure of a subgoal. We wi_ cal] this the 'reflective' property of
the system.
In reflective systems two modes of behaviour can be distinguished: satisfaction behaviour in
which a task network is synthesized after which all the subgoals are attempted to be satisfied
and avoldance behaviour in which replanning is initiated to patch up failing (sub)goals. Sole
OFC systems axe not able to find alternatives for their attempts to satisfy their goals, while
reflective systems are (in principle) able to apply alternatives.
With the property of reflectiveness we have completed our specifications for a system that
has maximal adaptivity. Before we continue to examine its properties, we will make one last
remark about the epistemological status of the ontogenetic goals. In the previous section
we argued that a system that has no fixed evaluation criteria is undirected and that the
criteria are fixed by environmental constraints passed on through the genome. We now have
a network of OFC systems that interact through their goal-state descriptions (the respective
r's). Because the OFC systems are hierarchically organized, higher level goals can act as
supervisors of lower level goals and change their goal-state depending on performance which
creates possibilities for percept-action coordination that Cariani only granted the general
evolutionary device type 7.
5 Goal-Robustness, Independence and Autonomy
In the previous section the two main functional modes of goal-directedness, i.e. satisfaction
and avoidance behaviour were discussed, and the canonical position of the goals was estab-
lished through examining the adaptive design. The canonicailty of the goals has another
implication, viz. the property of goal-robustness. If a system has the property of goal-
robustness all of its goals are instantiations of a set of irreducible or primitive goals of which
the existence w_ shown in the previous section. The issue in this section is the functiona_ty
of the system that can generate endogenous or receive external goals.
Section 5.1 demonstrates the connection between the autonomous feature of independence
as proposed by (Castelfranchi, 1994) and the property of goal-robustness. Independence
derives from a mechanism that implements goal-robustness, i.e. only those goals are as-
similated and scheduled that are consistent with the primitive goals. Finally, the criteria
7His claim that a system is only truly emergent if a system places itself outside the observational frame
of the designer is, according to our opinion, mistaken. (Rosen, 1986) has made a case for the informational
equivalency of behavioural determining factors, i.c. genome and state, that shows the fundamental impos-
sibil;ty of reducing observations to one of these factors as an explanation. In fact, this is a methodological
problem of underdetetminedness of observations through which it is in principle not possible to make a
distinction between the adaptive - and the general evolutionary device type.
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for assimilating directives from other agents are formafized which completesthe features
necessaryfor autonomy. Figure 4 schematicallyshowsthe canonicalposition of the goals.
Autonomy
Independence
Adaptivity
conditionalassimilation
of new information
_ C_al-Rob_eu 4
Functionalityof
Goal-directedness
partialplans
avoidance satisfaction
(reactivness)
I
Goals
J
Figure 4: The two parts of autonomy and their relation. Independence is
just//ied by the MAS property" ofadaptiweness to uncerta/a circumstances.
5.1 Criteria for Autonomy
According to CasteIfranchi there are two kinds of autonomy, viz. [1] autonomy from physical
context (from environment) and [2] autonomy from social context (from other agents). He
refers to [1] as the "Descartes Problem": "Which Agent Architecture guaranties that the
Agent is neither completely determined by stimuli (stimulus dependent), nor completely
unreactive to environmental changes?" (p. 52).
We interpret [1] as the question of how action can originate from the agent, i.e. endogenously
rather than completely from the current situation. The embedded feedback systems archi-
tecture, discussed in the previous sections, provides a solution. All the goals in the planning
system are instantiations of the fylogenetic goals, and therefore provide an explanation of
behaviour that doesn't originate from the current situation. Thus, the task network com-
bines situational appropriateness and conformity to the fylogenetic goals s. The execution of
the task network is constantly being monitored, adjusting when necessary and even aban-
doning the current action pattern if it appears to be inadequate. Execution monitoring and
adjustment provides the required reactivity. With the ability to pursue endogenous goals, an
agent could be said to be independent from its environment. Actually, the property that is
intuitively closer to independence is independence from other agents, which is Castelfranchi's
second criterion.
Autonomy from social context means that an agent will not unconditionally follow goals
others propose to it. This follows naturally from the fact that primitive goals are stable and
SExplanation of behaviour of autonomous agents is diachronical rather than synchronical as it is in I/O
systems.
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that the agent's goal-state representations should be consistent, i.e. not have contradictory
goals, we will call this the property of goal-robustness. Providing the agent with goal consis-
tency is a distinct problem that requires various goals to be contrasted along a consistency
measure. It is clear that a consistency measure should be a function of the subjected goal
and the primitive goals. In the next subsection we will look at what this function might look
like.
5.2 Checking New Goals on Consistency
The question of how the goal state of individual agents changes when agents try to influ-
ence each other's goals explicitly, i.e. through communication of directives, is addressed by
(Werner, 1989). He contends, as we do, that in real life situations complete plans cannot be
communicated (Ibid. p. 7) and that goal states can't be changed by others unconditionally
(Ibid. p. 17). However, except for a few well-defined cases in which the organizational
structure determines the conditions under which new goals are assimilated (so called roles),
he doesn't define a function that tests received goals on compatibility with agent-dependent
utility functions. We will make a first attempt in order to specify the property of goal-
robustness that was introduced in the previous Sect_om -
Task networks are usually assembled by searching for task operators that reduce the differ-
ence between the current - and the goal state (cf (Charniak & McDermott, 1985, ch. 9)).
The result is a gos/conjunction lr that can be matched against the current situation repre-
sented in I. In lr there may be a number of variableS, either to be bound to other operators
or to primitives in the situation representation, we wiU denote this as follows: _r0 in which
0 represents the set of free variables °. On assembly of the plan, the setof differences can be
reduced by replacing g0al conjuncts by conjuncts that have greater detail and therefore a
better match with the situation, until the planner has found a max/ms/match Substitution.
In effect this is a reduction of the number of free variables to a substitution such that for all
other substitutions 0_, ]7¢0- I[ < [_rO'- I I.
In a task network the leaves of the planning tree are matched in this way to the situations.
However, we do not only want to know how well a task network fits s particular situation but
also how well a particular taks network instantiates the primitive goals, which is ultimately
where the agent is directed at. Any subgoal can be tested on fit with a higher-level goal from
which a utility value is produced which is maximal when the match is perfect, i.e. when there
are no free variables. On perfect match, a task network will completely be executable and
it wiU realize a high-level goal. Analogous to the matching of a task network to a particular
situation, a particular instantiation lr'0 can be matched to a higher'level g0al _r. Analogous
to maximal fit, maximal utility with respect to g0a_ _ is defined as follows:
vo' o (1)
For a perfect plan the following holds: _r'O c_ lr C I. Overall utility of the instantiation is
9Our notation is a mixture of Charniak & McDermotts, of Wetners and our own.
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defined as follows:
1
E(w, _r', 0) = [_"0 - _"'I _" (2)
In which A,_ is an overall utility value of lr or a constant if lr is a direct instantiation of a
primitive goal. Hence there exists a set of fixed utilities, _ that is a subset of the total set
of utilities and which is indexed to the set of primitive goals _: _ _ _; _ C_ IT and • C_A.
The evaluation function enables the planner to decide which goal and instantiation to choose.
The utility of a particular goal depends recursively on the match with a primitive goal, hence
goals that instantiate a highly rated primitive goal well are preferred above goals that are
either poorer instantiations or linked to lower rated primitive goals. In an environment
where the planning agent is liable to influence, the evaluation function provides a strong
criterion for assimilation of a communicated goal. There are two possible situations: either
the received goal is an instantiation of a priorly uninstantiated goal, or it is a replacement
of an already existing goal. In the first case the criterion for assimilation is that total utRity
must increase: E,_ E(lr_,_r_,O) _ E,_ E(_r_,(_r_ + _r_),0) in which n equals the total number
of goals. In the second case the criterion is that if the received goal can be instantiated
so that it has a higher evaluation value than an already present goal, it will be assimilated
into a task network and executed, otherwise it will be rejected. Formally, the criterion for
accepting the new goal _r_ at the cost of goal lr_ is: E(_,7c_,0) _ E(lr, lr_,O).
6 Conclusions
In the last section we have examined the property of goal-robustness as the last of the de-
sign specifications of an autonomous agent. This property has far-stretching consequences
for spacecraft control. It means that ground control commands will not be unconditionally
accepted, i.e. commands may be rejected when they don't meet the criteria specified above.
The relation ground-control/spacecraft becomes one of cooperation in which joint plan for-
mation is possible by exchanging high-level goals and information. This is the way in which
independent agents cooperate in a real-life situation (Werner, 1989, p. 7). This organiza-
tional structure is more appropriately classified as a MAS. Primarily this is the case because,
due to communication limitation, the spacecraft can't 'think' on the ground and it has to
take decisions directly in response to its environment (when the situation requires prompt
action) or in absence of a consultant (when communication with ground control fails). In
this light the expressed position % fully autonomous space[craft] is neither achievable nor
necessarily desirable." (Easter & Staehle, 1984, p. 5-2) has to be revised, while the question
"... how long a space platform can perform a given function, even in the presence of new
and existing faults, without intervention or direction from ground personnel or equipment"
(Ibid.) can be answered by: indefinite, but more likely better if ground control recommen-
dation is available. In that sense, as we have shown in this paper, we fuUy agree with the
following two standpoints (Ibid. p. 3-4): "No autonomous system is actually free of hu-
man supervision; autonomous systems do not replace humans in this sense." because the
high-level goals are always originating from humans and high-level goals can't be replaced
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by the system itself; "[autonomous systems] provide much more flexibility for determining
the optimal degree, nature and location of human participation in space activities", indeed
they do, because they determine the appropriateness of human advice and direction.
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